Articles

THE AGONIZING DILEMMA OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWEL

McCarthyism is only a bizarre highlight of the opposition that Eisenhower faces within his own party. A famous Canadian political writer now poses a crucial question-Will the President continue to sacrifice his personal beliefs in trying to cement the splits among the Republicans?

BRUCE HUTCHISON May 15 1954
Articles

THE AGONIZING DILEMMA OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWEL

McCarthyism is only a bizarre highlight of the opposition that Eisenhower faces within his own party. A famous Canadian political writer now poses a crucial question-Will the President continue to sacrifice his personal beliefs in trying to cement the splits among the Republicans?

BRUCE HUTCHISON May 15 1954

THE AGONIZING DILEMMA OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWEL

BRUCE HUTCHISON

McCarthyism is only a bizarre highlight of the opposition that Eisenhower faces within his own party. A famous Canadian political writer now poses a crucial question-Will the President continue to sacrifice his personal beliefs in trying to cement the splits among the Republicans?

AT CLOSE sight the face of Dwight David Eisenhower is the face of a man who has mastered himself. It is the face of a poor boy from Abilene who, as he says, never realized his poverty until he became rich and famous, whose heart is still with the little man everywhere, whose inner world is as simple, honest and clean as the American earth. That earth and that dream are transcribed legibly upon the man who mastered himself.

Up to this spring anyway, Eisenhower has not mastered his job as President of the United States and the most powerful person in the free world. He has hardly begun to grasp the political process on which the future of the free world will mainly hang. Roosevelt’s aura of greatness, the hypnotic voltage which surged from the cripple pinioned in his chair, has disappeared from the White House. The cocksure, small-town confidence of Truman is gone also. In their place stands an able, modest and puzzled soldier.

He has taken into the presidency neither the scholarship of Wilson, the mystical touch of Roosevelt nor Truman’s violent hatreds. Instead, he has taken into it a fine but rather naive idealism, a unique soldier’s experience of the world at large, a hunch that Washington is only a larger Abilene, a notion that the methods of his boyhood and of the army will work in national politics.

Eisenhower meets the naked inquisition of his weekly press conference as a figure of personal victory. Before this year is out he could become a figure of political tragedy.

As he approaches the autumn Congressional election he does not face some minor rebellion among his followers. He faces an organized assault on his own policies, on the presidency, on the American system of government, on the decencies of public life, on everything he holds dear. In meeting that assault, or failing to meet it, he will make or lose his place in history.

His office, his support among the American people and the current flow of history give Eisenhower and no one else the chance to master this historic dilemma. His success could save, his failure wreck, the Republican Party. But much more than the Republican Party or the present American Government is at stake in the perilous career of Eisenhower. It involves, through his nation’s power, every human being on earth.

Why, within eighteen months of his triumphant election, does this man confront perhaps the gravest personal crisis confronted by any president in the twentieth century? For several reasons.

First, he won the election of 1952 but his party did not win it and even now may represent a minority of the nation.

Second, a large minority of the party and a majority of its professional politicians did not want him nominated in the first place, were elected solely by his popularity, are trying now to use him for their own purposes and remain further from him, in all essentials, than the Democrats.

Third, he reached office, not in those easy-going times which made many small presidents like Coolidge look large, nor at a time of sudden crisis in which a President may almost automatically take on the greatness of events around him, but at a time of transition from emergency to stability, a time of anti-climax and sudden doubt, the toughest possible time for a new national leader.

Fourth, at the beginning he misconceived the presidency, his own powers and the power of the enemies within his party. He attempted the impossible experiment of lifting the presidency above politics and ruling like a constitutional monarch through a prime minister, in the person of his original opponent, Senator Taft. T hat unworkable arrangement collapsed with Taft’s death. Then, Eisenhower discovered that the president is not only the executive and commanderin-chief but also a party leader, and that continued on page 79

The Dilemma of Dwight D. Eisenhower

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 21

only through the instrument of a party and the turmoil of practical politics can lie accomplish anything. That is the American system which Eisenhower has yet to master, which the enemies in his own camp are endangering.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say of his party managers that never have so few men plunged a new administration into such a mess in so short a time. Under their guidance, the GOP has looked less like a party than a brawl. At the convention of 1952 the professionals lost to Eisenhower by a narrow margin but they planted a time bomb under the winner. It has lately exploded. It could be lethal to him.

This spring marked the end of the apprenticeship. As so often in war, Eisenhower is nearing the moment of ultimate, lonely and irrevocable decision. In some respects his is a personal crisis without precedent.

The last election showed that a large majority of the American people wanted Eisenhower and his ideas in government. Yet the legislative majority necessary for this purpose was denied him. Hut the lack of a majority in Congress is only one aspect of the President’s crisis. Other presidents have lacked a majority and succeeded without it. Other presidents have faced rebellions among their followers. Eisenhower’s position is unique in modern times because the primitives of his party are rebelling not only against his basic beliefs but against history itself.

Might In a Brown Suit

The nature and depth of this rebellion can be judged when a student of politics as experienced and moderate as Walter Lippman says that “We have gone as far as we can without endangering profoundly the peace and order of this country ... It is very dangerous to suspend the restraints of reason. For beyond them is only the primordial violence into which men, when their laws are broken, lapse.”

The President’s immediate problem is clear to everybody: he must be President and tame or repudiate the primitives. What happens when he attempts to do it by conciliation?

The scene at his press conference when the issue first arises is dignified, good-natured and deceptive.

’There stands the President in a natty brown suit and gaily figured spring tie, the commonplace, casual costume of any young American businessman, the badge of a democratic society. Nothing about him, except the watchful secretservice men, indicates that the lean upright figure, the homely face, the boyish grin represent the mightiest power of our age.

He looks tanned, healthy and rehexed—much more relaxed than the magnetic, actor’s figure of Roosevelt or the dashing, trigger-happy Truman. If you didn’t know who Eisenhower was you could imagine that he had no cares, no doubts and no enemies. Only the twitching of his locked hands behind his back and a sudden flow of blood into Ais cheeks when his famous temper rises, show that he is standing before the eyes of mankind.

As a man he is irresistible, the kind of man you would like to go fishing with, a simple man, in the best sens«.“ of the word. Hut is he a great man in a time that calls for greatness?

He has yet to prove it. I f the element of true greatness is lacking, if this is not a Washington, Lincoln, Wilson or

Roosevelt, that of itself is no fatal defect. Some of the most successful presidents have not been great men, vet accomplished great results. ’Truman is a classic example.

What is needed today is not genius but common sense and courage. Eisenhower has both, the common sense of the western prairies, the courage of battle. Will he use them? That is the question raised by this meeting with the press and world public.

Eisenhower knows what is coming today, is braced for it and undoubtedly has his replies rehearsed in disarmingly

extemporaneous phrases. He knows because the Republican National Committee has just committed an unbelievable offense against the legend of the first Republican President, Abraham Lincoln. To celebrate Lincoln’s birthday, invoke the immortal memory and make votes for the party’s candidates next autumn, the National Committee has chosen, of all people. Senator Joseph McCarthy as its official spokesman.

With malice toward all that the President values, with charity to none if they happen to be Democrats, Mc-

Carthy has been surging through the nation and repeating at one-night stands a speech entitled Twenty Years of ’Treason, the treason of the Roosevelt and Truman Governments (which, ironically enough, made Eisenhower’s career as supreme commander in war and, again in NATO).

Among other things McCarthy has just said that “the Democratic label is now the property of men who have been unwilling to recogniz« evil or who bent to whispered pleas from the lips of traitors . . . men and women who wear flie political label stitched with the idiocy of a Truman, rotted by the deceit of an Aeheson, corrupted by the Red slime of a White.” In the hands of McCarthy, Lincoln has suffered something like a second martyrdom.

What has the leader of Lincoln’s Republican Party, McCarthy’s leader, to say about that? The President answers quietly that he is not much of a partisan himself, that American elections have always been notoriously rough, that their bitterness should not be taken too seriously and that the times are too grave for extreme partisanship. He does not doubt the patriotism of the Democratic Party. Democrats fought for their country, didn’t they? And he needs their support in Congress.

This is a rebuke, though a pretty gentle one, to the Republican Party management which employed McCarthy and others like him for the Lincoln celebrat ion, solely because t hey seemed likely to make friends and influence people.

The correspondents press the Presi-

dent harder. Does he approve the action of the National Committee in underwriting McCarthy as an “asset” and endorsing his tour? The smiling face sets hard. The eyes narrow. The tanned cheeks redden. No, says the President, an edge of temper in his voice, he is not going to comment further on this matter and, as he has said many times before, he is not going to talk about personalities. Since the whole question is one of personalities, he has evaded it.

Fried Chicken That Backfired

That, night and in succeeding days McCarthy answered the President and evaded nothing. He ignored his leader's plea for moderation and decency. He went on repeating his broken-record chorus, the Twenty Years of Treason. His colleague, Senator Tenner, plunged right overboard by announcing (in Lincoln's memory) that Truman had sent American boys to die in Korea with the deliberate intention of assuring their

defeat on the battlefield. There are no English words, at least no printable ones, to describe such a speech.

Such was the opening public scene in the drama of Eisenhower and McCarthy. Many other scenes, of mounting violence and unbelievable disorder, have followed. Doubtless, before this is printed, still more will have filled the headlines at home and damaged the good name of the United States abroad.

McCarthy’s attack on the honor of the Army, whose commander-in-chief is the President; the fiasco of Army Secretary Robert T. Stevens, who at first; stood firm and then, at a friedchicken luncheon with McCarthy and other rebels, retreated in confusion; the soothing explanation which explained nothing, as prepared by White House insiders while the President cooled off by practicing golf shots on the lawn; the Gilbert and Sullivan affair in which the Army accused McCarthy and his counsel, Roy Cohn, of trying to protect their young pal, David Schine, from military duty which the two accused

countered by charging that the Army had tried to buy them off by offering grave evidence against the Navy and Air Force; the Miami speech of Adlai Stevenson calling the Government half Eisenhower and half McCarthy; the mild answer, not from the President, but from Vice-President Nixon; the attack of Senator Flanders, a Republican, on McCarthy and the President’s endorsement in vague generalities—all these plays-within-a-play have produced a springtime political melodrama too improbable even for Hollywood.

They may also have carried McCarthy too far. At this writing it is said that he has been given enough rope and is about to hang himself. It may turn out so. But up to now, if McCarthy is in process of destruction, the President has not managed it. He has faithfully followed the advice of the professionals, who tell him that to break openly with McCarthy would be to break the party on the eve of the election.

Actually McCarthy’s overt assault on the presidency began on the afternoon of Oct. 2, 19f)2, when Eisenhower first appeased his enemy at Peoria, Illinois. Eisenhower intended to make a speech in McCarthy’s bailiwick of Wisconsin, praising General Marshall, whom McCarthy had attacked for “contributing so greatly to the strategy of defeat.” McCarthy demanded that Eisenhower drop any reference to Marshall from his Wisconsin speech. Eisenhower argued with McCarthy for an ¡ hour in a hotel room. The offending paragraphs were dropped on the advice of the professionals.

“From that time on,” says the New York Times, “McCarthy had little fear of Dwight Eisenhower . . . McCarthy has gone on from there to one victory after another over Eisenhower.”

The little Munich of Peoria was the beginning. What is the end? Bv this spring the forces long piling up reached the point of detonation but still the puzzled man, practicing golf shots on the lawn, was listening to the profes1 sionals and putting the welfare of the party—as they construe it—above his own feelings, convenience and reputation.

Such outright rebellion is confined lo McCarthy and a small, hard core of his friends, it took another form equally dangerous when Senator Langer, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, published a series of accusations against Chief Justice Earl Warren, the President’sappointee—accusations filed with the committee but unsupported by i any evidence.

This kind of thing does not merely indict a few Democratic politicians and a Republican Chief Justice. It indicts the political system because the opposition party is an essential part of that system, second in importance only to the governing party. It is calculated to make the nation doubt its political institutions, its courts and itself. It poisons society. And as anyone knows after a visit to Britain and Europe, it erodes not only Eisenhower’s leadership of party and nation but the United States’ good name, leadership and power throughout the civilized world. Therein lies Eisenhower’s crisis.

If there are few McCarthys, Jenners and Langers attacking the presidency, the courts and the institutions of society, if the McCarthy group in the Senate includes hardly more than a dozen men, they are only half, perhaps the lesser half, of the President’s crisis. The other and more enduring half lies in the clear fact that the President is in disagreement on fundamentals with a large segment, possibly a majority, of his respectable followers.

This fact, generally disguised in the year of apprenticeship, came unmistakably alive in the test of the Brieker constitutional amendment. Moved by a leading Republican senator, it proposed to circumscribe the powers of the presidency in foreign affairs and it represented the powerful isolationism still dwelling in the Republican Party.

Aroused at last in the defense of the Constitution, the President is said have fought off the Brieker amendment. In fact, it was defeated in the Senate only with the support of the Democrats. A compromise amendment was then proposed by Senator Walter George, the veteran Democrat, and

rejected by the President. It was defeated by a single vote. In this final test thirty-two Republicans voted against, the President, including his Senate leader, William Knowland, and only fourteen supported him. The President was deserted, in the most vital sort of issue, by a two-to-one majority of his supporters and rescued by t he Democrats. Even that spectacle of division failed to stop the rebels. Senator Brieker immediately announced that he would fight for his amendment and against his leader’s views in the autumn election.

Again, in foreign affairs, especially in the affairs of Asia, the President’s policy and his Secretary of State are criticized not so much by the Democrats as by the Republicans, and most of all by Knowland.

McCarthyism is thus only the most obvious and garish aspect of the larger split between Eisenhower and the right wing of his party. The quarrel covers all the basic issues of policy. It goes to the very root of things. It is organic.

From it. McCarthy emerges not as a passing maverick, a temporary aberration or political clown but as one of the

strongest figures in the nation. His power is built not alone on his own abilities but on the dark forces and ancient ghosts of American society which he can summon from the depths.

If there were any doubt about his power it was removed when the Senate came to consider an appropriation for the continued work of his investigating committee. Normally such a vote would be given by a few members of the Senate without debate and with little publicity. On this occasion Republican senators dropped all other business, rushed to the Senate floor and recorded their approval. None could afford to have his name missing from the official record. None dared to slight McCarthy. A single Democrat. Fulbright of Arkansas, voted against him.

His power goes beyond the Senate into the Government itself. James Reston, of the New York Times, the best-known correspondent in the capital, reports that the McCarthy witch hunt already has “hounded and investigated” the State Department “to such an extent that its usefulness has beer impaired ... it was sacrificed to political expediency.”

Some government officials, says Resten, are quietly passing out information to McCarthy and seeking his protection because they cannot get it from the heads of their departments. This may be shocking but must be temporary. More serious is McCarthy’s attempt to usurp the constitutional powers of the executive, with communism as his immediate target but, beyond it, with the President in the sights of his gun. Infinitely more serious still is the bitter schism and hate engendered in t he body of society—the one thing that the Kremlin desires, cannot buy, but is now offered free—when honest Americans begin to suspect their neighbors, when, indeed, at least half of society, the Democratic voters, are accused of nourishing treason and the integrity of the state itself is impeached.

It was precisely this sort of division that the magic of the Eisenhower myth was expected to close. His whole and apparently sincere motive in entering politics was to cure what he considered a social illness. Under him, against his will and thanks entirely to his supporters, the illness has spread, deepened and increased in virulence.

Why, the foreigner may ask. has McCarthy been preserved, so far, by the right wing? Solely, of course, because he is expected to get more votes next autumn than the President’s program which, in many respects, does not suit the right wing anyway. If this calculation is mathematically sound in hard-boiled politics, and if it succeeds, McCarthy’s talents as a vote-getter can only increase the President’s longrun danger. If friends of McCarthy secure many of the party nominations, if other Republicans are elected by his support, they will augment his strength and the President’s weakness, on fundamental issues, in the next Congress.

Some of the best brains in Washington believe that victory in the election would be worse for the President than defeat.

So long as he lacks a majority in the legislature he cannot be properly blamed for its acts. If his program is whittled down by the present Congress that is not his fault. If he basa Republican majority in the next Congress he must take the responsibility, in the public mind, for the results, however bad.

On the other hand, if he faced a hostile legislature next year the Democratic Party would have to accept responsibility for every piece of legislation. The President would be in the strategic position occupied by Truman in 1918 when he won his election by attacking a Republican Congress for impeding his policies.

The President could appear as the people’s friend obstructed by the Democratic Opposition, as a Gulliver in the White House chained down by the Lilliputian pygmies of Capitol Hill. Then, having no majority to lose, he could act pretty much as he chose, exploit his dilemma, appeal directly to the voters over the head of Congress and win re-election in 1956.

This is an interesting theory but a theory and no more. Political leaders and parties never court defeat in any election, and in the present case defeat, halfway through a popular President’s first term, might well assure the Government’s destruction two years hence.

Far more is at stake than the 1954 or 1956 elections. As one of the most experienced observers of Congressional politics puts it: “If. after twenty years of opposition and failure, the Republicans can’t win the usual second term, if the Democrats return in 1956, T don’t expect to live to see another Republican administration. Next autumn the Republican Party will not be playing another round in a parlor game. They’ll be playing for keeps.”

Neither Eisenhower’s record, McCarthy’s rebellion nor the Communist issue will finally determine the outcome of the autumn poll. Both sides of politics agree that it will be decided in the end by the current economic state of the nation. A real recession could assure a Republican defeat. Rising prosperity could assure victory. Hence there is far more politics than economics in the Government’s present fiscal policies. At any cost the nation must feel prosperous when it enters the polling booths.

The Ardent Kiss of Death

The Democratic politicians—happy to find the public eye diverted from their own party split on the issue of civil liberties—are watching their enemy’s troubles as an unexpected gift from Providence.

Their present public posture is a dignified horror, above cheap partisanship and, so far, above direct attack on a popular President. Instead, he is given Stevenson’s sympathy, perhaps more damaging than direct attack. The Democrats of the Congress are ready as the autumn battle develops either to condemn Eisenhower or rush again to his rescue with an ardent kiss of death, to humiliate him and reveal the Republican split.

In their national scalping party the Republican rebels have almost forgotten the President’s “dynamic, forwardlooking” program which he calls the real issue of the election. What actually is happening to the program? Has Eisenhower failed to get what he intended in fhe “crusade” of 1952? Has he accomplished nothing of importance? No, lie has accomplished probably more than could have been expected without control of Congress and against his own insurgents.

He has drastically curtailed the national budget, begun to cut taxes, brought a soldierly efficiency into the sprawling muddle of administration, largely ended the feuds of Truman’s time between the agencies of government and erected a smooth-running general staff which saves time and money.

Nevertheless, by one of the usual ironies of politics and by the iron laws of history beyond his power to control, the Eisenhower domestic policy is nothing more nor less than the consolidation of Roosevelt’s New Deal and Truman’s Fair Deal.

No retreat from the New Deal, on

the contrary a large advance, is implicit in the President’s plan to expand the Roosevelt-Truman system of social security on a large scale. It is explicit in the Government’s fiscal policy, the central operating mechanism of the national economy. What does this policy mean? Stripped of political verbiage, it simply means that the ghost of Maynard Keynes, the English economic visionary who was Roosevelt’s mentor, is managing the American economic system.

When Eisenhower guarantees to crush any possible depression in the

bud by the Keynesian techniques of pump priming, easy credit, tax reductions, budgetary deficits and, if necessary, by governmental spending, he is not repealing the New and Fair Deals. He is expanding them. He proposes to use their fiscal mechanism more promptly and massively, in case of need, than Roosevelt ever dared to do.

In his economic policies Eisenhower thus rejects what Jenner hopefully calls the Republican Revolution, knowing it to be only a hopeless counter-revolution. The actual revolution begun during Roosevelt’s first Hundred Days

still moves on. Eisenhower can only try to guide it and keep it within bounds. He is committed wholly to an experiment which, like a bicycle on a tightrope across the Grand Canyon, cannot stop moving, perhaps cannot even pause for needed repairs and adjustments.

Yet there is a difference between the economics of the Roosevelt and Eisenhower eras, not in method but in atmosphere. An eminent expert in Wall Street puts it thus: “We know now

that there is no turning back. The revolution is here to stay. But whereas Roosevelt and Truman seemed to regard private enterprise; as an enemy to be punished, Ike regards it as a friend to be encouraged. That change in the Government’s attitude may be more important in its results, in building confidence, in keeping business buoyant, than a change in method.” Whether the method and the attitude c;ui conserve the postwar boom and prevent even the beginning of a recession remains to be seen. Canadians will watch Eisenhower’s economics with special concern since they must instantly affect the prospects of Canada.

If Canadians for the most part are suspicious of the Republican Party because its Smoot-Hawley tariff almost wrecked Canada some two decades ago, a leading statesman of Ottawa observes that, “After all, it’s a good thing the Republicans were elected. It means that both American parties and all but a minority of the nation have accepted the twentieth century.”

Eisenhower has likewise accepted the basic foreign policy of Roosevelt and 1 ruinan. For all the current slogans— New Look, Massive Retaliation, Peripheral Defense, Agonizing Reappraisal and (lu; rest the President is doing essentially what his predecessors did and would still lxdoing if they were in office today.

This does not mean that he has made no decisions. He has made decisions comparable to the gravest made by Roosevelt in tlxwar and Truman in Greece, Berlin and Korea. His supreme decision is based on bis own soldier’s judgment that Russia does not intend to make war in the visible future. Accordingly, he has altered the nation’s entire military planning. As a soldier he believes that American power is over-extended. He is withdrawing some of it from overseas and concentrating most of it at home in a mobile reserve, ready for massive retaliation by air and atomic weapons.

Finally, as they say in Washington, he has had the “courage of timidity” in liquidating the Korean War despite a powerful group in his party which stood by General MacArthur and the risk of a great war in Asia.

His negative achievements also arcimpressive. If Mackenzie King was right in his dictum that what a statesman does is often less important than what he doesn’t, Eisenhower has reason for some satisfaction.

“ Fo keep things in perspective,” says one of the wisest men in Washington, and a Democrat, “remember what hasn’t happened. There has been no world war and the chance of it has receded. I here hasn t been even a second Korea. The United States hasn’t bombed China. Rhee isn’t fighting. Chiang hasn’t landed on the mainland. American power hasn’t been withdrawn from the centre of Europe. The Grand Alliance hasn’t fallen apart. The bipartisan foreign policy creaks and groans but it hasn’t broken. There has been no depression. Republican tariffs— apart from quota restrictions on a few things—haven’t gone up. And all the present clamor is the best proof of the nation’s health.”

Most of the President’s program is either satisfactory to all sides of politics (tax reductions and social security for example) or can be compromised, even abandoned, without significant effect. One item in it must be approved or rejected. It happens to be the item of most urgent concern to Canada.

The President undertook to convert a high-tariff Republican Party to low tariffs and balanced international trade, to make the United States behave like a creditor nation. As his trade policy holds the world’s hope of prosperity, the world cannot be deceived by any possible disguise, manoeuvre or slogan.

The tariff issue, raised by the President himself, is concrete and visible. Yet it is here that he encounters the most stubborn resistance from the undying protectionism within his party.

His Randall Commission produced a weak tariff compromise in the hope of securing the Republican protectionists’ reluctant consent. That hope instantly collapsed. The protectionists have no intention of compromising. The President will be lucky if, by the autumn election, he has made even a small dent in the American protective system. But the showdown fight cannot be postponed for long.

Against the assets of the President’s ledger to date must be set an intangible but overbalancing loss—the damage to the Eisenhower myth in a society governed, like all others, more by myth than by fact. He has damaged his own myth by applying to politics the method of his generalship in the field, the method of counsel, conciliation and compromise between conflicting views. He has found that the taming of rival generals in Europe was child’s play beside his attempt to tame the politicians of Washington.

Accustomed to military obedience, to loyal officers and gentlemen of honor, he is appalled to find that politicians follow another code, that his friends of today may be enemies tomorrow, that a man who supports him on one issue may turn against him on another—in short, that the democraticprocess, even among honorable men like himself, is quite different from the process of war.

I he Roosevelt-Willkie Secret

He must know the stark facts of political life by now but he has yet to put his unequalled stature to work for himself, his party and his policies. It is not too late. The soldier is on unfamiliar terrain, with mutiny around him, but lx; is still Ike. In tlx; pinch the party cannot afford to quarrel with its indispensable man, to lose its supreme asset.

The sovereign question before Eisenhower today is whether he should lead the nation and compel the party to follow him. He can do it if lxwill accept short-run losses for long-run gains. Recently he told a Republican gathering in Washington: “ix-t us lift our chins and our heads, scjuare our shoulders and walk right square into them.” Into whom? The real enemy inhabits his own camp.

Another President once faced a somewhat similar quandary, though he kept it under better control. Franklin Roosevelt sent a secret emissary to Wendell Willkie, his only formidable opponent, just before he died, to propose that the two should escape the schisms of both parties by forming a new one of liberal policy. Willkie was favorable but tlx; bold design, which could have revolutionized American politics, died with its architects.

The conditions which produced it have not died. Both parties are still split between right and left. National politics are in deep confusion. American society, with all its outward success, is seized by profound inward ferment. That process eventually will reflect itself in political parties because they are a democratic society’s only available instruments.

Eisenhower perhaps could make himself the catalyst of such a chemistry and a towering figure in American history.

At: the moment he does not look like such a figure. He looks like a prairie boy, a great soldier, an irresistible companion, a bewildered tourist who has followed the professional guides and lost his way in the foreign land of politics.