Why United States Textbooks in Canadian Schools?

H. NAPIER MOORE July 1 1929

Why United States Textbooks in Canadian Schools?

H. NAPIER MOORE July 1 1929

Why United States Textbooks in Canadian Schools?

Our own laxity and apathy are responsible for the instruction of Canadian youth according to the viewpoint of Uncle Sam


IF THOUSANDS of Canadian children attending a large number of Canadian schools were cut off from all sources of information save their school textbooks, their total knowledge concerning Canada’s part in the Great War would be summed up in exactly nineteen words.

Other thousands, similarly situated, would possess the information that “for about a year and a half the French, aided by a small number of British and; Belgian troops, held back the German masses.” These same Canadian children might also tell you that these forces manned the Allied trenches “until the United States,, which early in 1917 entered the war, was mustering, drilling and transporting to France a great army of over two million men.”

In addition, you would, probably be told that from 1914 to 1916 the British were “not a real factor in the battle lines.” And that the naval convoy system was “impossible of effective adoption before the United States entered the war because of the lack of antisubmarine craft.”

Apart from the historical knowledge of these Canadian children, in so far as it concerns the years 1914 to date, many of them can translate “The Star Spangled Banner” from a Latin textbook. They cannot do the same with “God Save the King,” “0, Canada,” or “The Maple Leaf,” for the simple reason that these anthems are not in the book.

These same Canadian children would instantly recognize photographs of a number of United States presidents. They would not be so sure about Sir John A. Macdonald or others among those who brought the Dominion of Canada into being.

The reason for all this is that in some Canadian provinces the educational authorities insist on using United States textbooks.

The Point at Issue

TET it be distinctly ^ understood that MacLean’s Magazine is not sponsoring raillery or bitterness against the United States, its people, or its schools. Far from it. Its point is that Canada is not part of the United States, and that textbooks prepared for the use of United States schools are not suitable for use in Canadian schools if our children aré to be educated from the Canadian and British viewpoint.

A year ago, MacLean’s published “The Truth About the War.” Publicspirited men and women have been the means of placing 175,000 copies of the reprint of Major Drew’s article in the hands of school-children and others throughout the Dominion. Today, after one year, thousands of extra copies are being printed to supply the continuing demand. Similar reprints of “Canada’s Part in the War,” of which tens of thousands have been distributed to schools, have played^ no small part in rectifying what has been an amazing ignorance 'of Canada’s own magnificent effort.

The principal motive behind these distributions is a desire on the part of the parents of Canada that their children shall obtain a proper perspective of the part played by the British Empire in the greatest test of nationhood ever demanded. That same motive has been responsible for the vigorous protests that have from time to time been lodged with the educational authorities in question concerning the use in Canadian schools of United States textbooks. It is not due to a desire on the part of Canadian parents, or on the part of MacLean’s, to glorify war, or to raise a nation of swordrattlers. The principle of the education of Canada’s younger generations on the basis of a Canadian viewpoint and British Empire standards is the point upon which this article is intended to focus public attention.

Nor does that principle affect war histories alone.

j Two Books in Dispute

TN USE in certain sections of Canada today are two books around which a storm has raged for some time. They are West’s “Modern Progress” and Myer’s “General History.” Eight years ago, Myer’s “General History” was discontinued in the schools of Manitoba. The same province considered the use of West’s “Modern History,” but decided against it. . Alberta has crossed both books off its list. Prince Edward Island uses neié'lf|r. But in Nova Scotia a.nd Quebec, West’s book is used, and Saskatchewan .and New Brunswick stand by Myeï’s^ For British Columbia-and, to some extent, in Ontario, a “Canadian edition” of West’s “Modern Progress” is in use, of which a word will be said later.

Both textbooks in dispute are United States products, printed there, and intended for the use of the schools of that country. The policies and development of other nations, including our own, are judged by United States standards. They are not Canadian. standards. They are not British standards. And the' books are not suited to the education of children of this Dominion, however satisfactory they may be to the teachers of the United States. ;

In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick particularly/representative bodies have protested their use to the provincial authorities on numerous occasions. The press has exposed their inadequacy and, in some instances, distortion. Nothing is done.

Let us examine these books.

As a survey of the progress of the nations of the world, Willis Mason West’s book is not without high quality. To do it justice, it devotes a considerable portion of its contents to English history. It is well produced, well illustrated, well prepared. It is when it comes to the period from 1914 to date that the American edition in use in many schools ceases to be an adequate source of information for Canadian youth.

To West, viewing it from the standpoint of United States students; the war is divided into two great phases—before and after the United States entered. Unlike Myer’s book, West’s does not lose a sense of proportion in so far as the efforts of the belligerents are concerned. It makes no serious distortion. From the standpoint of the United States child and teacher it is a fair enough summary. But from the standpoint of the Canadian child and teacher it has one lurid deficiency. In thirtyfour pages of description of the war’s engagements, Canada is dismissed in exactly nineteen words! The only references to the Dominion are as follows:

“Further, England’s distant daughtercommonwealths— Camada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and even her Indian Empire—were rousing themselves splendidly to the defense of their common civilization.”

And the nineteen words, descriptive of the Second Battle of Ypres:

“That the line held against this attack uas due largely to the splendid gallantry of the new Canadian divisions.”

Apart from Canadian participation altogether, this history is oblivious to many of the important phases of Britain’s campaign on both land and sea. There is nothing about Kitchener, Jutland or Zeebrugge.

To conclude his book, West has deemed “In Flanders Fields” a worthy peroration, but neglects to mention that John McRae, its author, was a Canadian, as every Canadian child should be told.

So much for the American edition of West’s “Modern Progress” and the part it plays in creating within the Canadian youth a pride of Canada.

The “Canadian edition” of this textbook has an injection of additional pages, edited by Mack Eastman, describing at greater length the part played by Canada and the Empire. Here Jutland and Zeebrugge are mentioned. Also it is recorded that the German squadron under Admiral Von Spee “outmatched and destroyed Cradock’s squadron at Coronel.” It is further recorded that the British Navy “took its revenge.” But it doesn’t tell how.

Nor are Canada’s fighting forces given too much space. The historic Second Battle of Ypres is disposed of with the words, “only the valorous intervention of the First Canadian Division checked the enemy onrush and allowed the dangerous gap to be closed.”

Here are Error and Distortion

IT IS Myer’s “General History,” however, that is the worst offender. Here we have not merely omissions, but errors and distortions of glaring type, and in no manner can this be more effectively demonstrated than by publication of the report of the New Brunswick Historical Society, a special committee of which was appointed to study Myer’s History and report on its suitability for use in the schools of New Brunswick.

From this point, the text is that of the above-mentioned report.

Myer’s “General History” is a United States product, and obviously intended for use in the schools of that country and not suitable for Canada. The policies and development of other nations, including our own, are judged by United States standards; and wherever the word “Our” is used, it, of course, refers to the United States * * * and not Canada.

Page 625—As in the case of the Emancipation of the Slaves in O UR Southern States, or

Page 61,7—Expansion of the United States, called the Growth of OUR OWN Country:

Page 662—Fundamentally a Struggle between Democracy and Autocracy and to Declare our Aim and Purpose in entering the War to be, etc., etc.

That the war was a supreme struggle between militaristic imperialism and nationalism was not at first clearly perceived by those remote from its area, but as the war progressed the real issues involved were more and more clearly revealed, so that when finally the United States entered the war on the side of the allies, President Wilson could declare a chief object of the war to be to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government.

Yet the gravity of the situation must have been realized in Canada as early as August, 1914, for within a few weeks after the outbreak of war the first Canadian division was on the seas, though Canada must be considered remote from the actual area. This particular statement might lead the reader to think that the true situation was first realized by the President of the United States; and though later, on Page 701, it is stated that:

Immediately upon the outbreak of war Canada, realizing the supreme issues involved in the conflict that Germany had precipitated, began to make hurried preparrations for placing her contingent alongside the Imperial British Forces.

The contradiction of the earlier statement is confusing, the geographical remoteness of both countries being equal.

Throughout the chapters dealing with the war an erroneous general conception of British effort is conveyed. To quote:

Page 680—For about a year and a half the French, aided by a small number of British and Belgian Troops, held back the German masses along this extended line, while a new British army, numbering several millions, was being raised, trained and equipped, and then for another like period, the Anglo-French-Belgian Forces manned the trenches, until the United States, which, early in 1917, had entered the war, was mustering, drilling and transporting to France a great army of over two million men.

From this the general thought is implied that first, France, then the British Empire, held the German Armies (their efforts covering a period of three years) but that from 1917, onward, the United States took over the trench-line and finally accomplished the defeat of the enemy. To examine the foregoing quotation in detail, consider the words:

For about a year and a half the French, aided by a small number of British and Belgian Troops, held back the German masses.

This is misleading, for within that time the British had on the Western Front over seven hundred and fifty thousand men; this cannot be considered a small number, and it equals, approximately, the total number of United States troops actually engaged at the time of their maximum effort in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.


Anglo-French-Belgian Forces manned the trenches until the United States, which early in 1917, entered the war, was mustering, drilling and transporting to France, a great army of over two million men.

Attention is directed to the fact that during the critical year of the war (1918), the bulk of the German Forces was massed against the British Army. (See map issued by the Department of National Defense, Ottawa, and Sir Douglas Haig’s dispatches 1918'. To imply anything different is untruthful and must be answered by comparison.

In the Meuse-Argonne offensive the United States Army exceeded the German Army by about four to one. It had the advantage of surprise, with the disadvantage of operating in a difficult country. The attack soon lost impetus, owing to the difficulties of supply and exploitation in such country. The army suffered from inexperienced leadership, which gave rise to reports regarding the inefficiency of the staff. The French Government, and even Marshal Foch, counselled the removal of the United States Staff and the substitution of a French one. This proposal of the substitution of a French Staff appears remarkable to British readers. General Pershing would not agree to it, giving as his reason * * * national honor. Subsequently, the offensive was renewed and brought to a successful conclusion. The bravery of the troops is unquestioned; their difficulties were those of a new army—lack of experience in administration and tactics. This operation constitutes the main United States military operation during the battles of 1918, ending at the signing of the Armistice, 11th November. The United States Armies captured during the whole war 49,841 Germans and 832 Austrians, and 850 guns. The British, in the last hundred days of the war (the period when, according to Myer’s “General History,” we draw the inference that the United States Army had taken over the bulk of the fighting) captured 187,000 men and 2,850 guns. The four Canadian Divisions alone captured during this period, 31,537 men and 623 guns.

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who commanded the group of German Armies on the Western Front directly opposed to the British, states that the reason for the German concentration against the British Armies on March 21, 1918, was because the High Command considered “the British the driving force of the war.”

This is confirmed by an extract from Sir Douglas Haig’s dispatch, 1918: “In six weeks of almost constant fighting, from March 21 to April 30, a total of fifty-five British Divisions and three Cavalry Divisions was employed on the battle-fronts against a force of 109 different German Divisions out of a total of 141.”

To quote Mr. Nelson P. Meade, of the College of the City of New York (Educational Department) American Expeditionary Force, speaking of the forced submission of Ludendorff,

In the North, where Haig attacks, and forces Ludendorff to the admission : Our war machine was no longer efficient, I had no hope of finding a strategic expedient where to turn the situation to our advantage * * * the war must be ended.

In the fall of 1918, the decision rested with Earl Haig whether to attack the great Hindenburg Line or wait till the next spring (1919) till the United States troops were in a better condition to co-operate. Even Foch hesitated to take the responsibility of ordering the army of another nation to attack this line. Haig, with supreme confidence in his army, and overcoming the fears of the politicians, decided to attack, and the war ended that fall. Myers is silent on this, and does not even mention the name of the great marshal.

Page 676 of the text states:

The violation of Belgium brought Great Britain into the war:

but does not mention the fact that the United States was also a signatory of the Hague Treaty respecting Belgian neutrality.

Page 703 : During the first two years of the war, before the British armies had become a real factor in the battle lines.

In warfare, if an army is not a factor, the conclusion must be drawn that through weakness in numbers or lack of tactical training, it is incapable of accomplishing anything that contributes toward the object in view—the defeat of the enemy. When this statement is applied to the British Army, it is an obvious untruth. The first two years of the war ended in August, 1916, and as early as September, 1914, at the Battle of the Marne, it has generally been conceded that the British Expeditionary Force played a decisive part, and was a real factor in the battle lines.

To quote Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. McDonough, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Adjutant-General of the Forces, in a lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institute, 15th November, 1921:

It was the British advance, threatening to cut the German line in two, which was the direct cause of the German retirement from the Marne.

Furthermore, the operations of Lord French in Flanders, later in the year, saved the Channel Ports, making possible the uninterrupted transport of men and munitions across the Channel throughout the war. The following spring Canadian troops saved the left of the Allied line by their heroic stand at Ypres. The Battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, though unsuccessful in the attainment of a complete break through, yet proved to the German High Command that the British Army was even then a real factor.

The British attack on the Somme, commencing July 1, 1916, relieved the pressure on Verdun, proving to be a real factor during a critical period.

A further passage which tends to confirm this misconception of British military effort during the first two years of the war, is contained in the statement that the British Army was “Virtually Annihilated” after the first Battle of Ypres in 1914. While this, seemingly, is a tribute to the valor of the original British Expeditionary Force, nevertheless, in the mind of the youthful reader this would create the impression that the British Army had, at a very early date, ceased to be a real factor in the war.

The truth is that after the autumn campaign of 1914, the battle-front became stabilized, owing to the exhaustion of the troops on both sides; and the British Expeditionary Force maintained its position. Rather an impossibility for an annihilated army.

In the description of the great German attacks during the spring of 1918, the reader is led to believe that the situation was saved by United States troops operating on the front at Château Thierry, for this so-called history states that:

American troops were hurried to the battle-front, the yielding French lines were stiffened and the German drive was checked.

A sense of proportion should be observed in this. The attack, according to General von Kuhl of the German General Staff, covered a front of forty miles. The United States troops engaged consisted of only one division, and it does not appear that they were particularly noticed by the German Staff, for von Kuhl admits that after a penetration of twenty miles, the German armies were incapable of exploiting their success through lack of reserve,— an entirely different reason to that given by Myers.

To attach great importance to small isolated engagements should not be the object of a history, unless in some way the course of events is altered.

Château Thierry and the subsequent action at Belleau Wood had no great effect upon the course of the war, though, undoubtedly, brave efforts.

Page 700 the astounding statement is found: The capture of the Saint Mihiel salient by United States troops on the 12th September, 1918:

Meant the speedy liberation of France.

In this affair 15,000 Germans were captured, and is called Operation A of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, Operation B being the main battle.

Marshal Foch intended this engagement to be strictly limited to straightening the line: it was conducted according to plan, and was regarded as a successful operation, to provide ground for the major attack which took place later.

On August 8, at Amiens, over a month before, Canadian and Australian Divisions had made the greatest advance in one day of any army during the war. Ludendorff calls it the turning-point of the war, and the dark day of the German Army. Myers does not notice it.

In the Amiens operation, 22,000 Germans were captured and 400 guns. During the month of August the British captured 57,318 Germans and 657 guns.

Page 702 reads:

When, through the arrival of United States troops, in force, the initiative had passed to the Allies.

A statement of this kind should be received with the utmost caution. Again the writer seeks to impress the mind with the idea that the presence of United States troops regained the initiative for the Allies in 1918. Nothing could be more misleading. During all the heavy fighting, from March 21 till the collapse of the German Offensive in July, only three United States Divisions were actively engaged, though five were in the line.

Initiative is one of the principles of war; to possess it gives an army the power of compelling the enemy to conform to its will.

In 1918, it passed to the Allies after July 15, when the German Offensive in the Champagne failed. The French IV, VII, V and VI-Armies were reinforced by one British, one United States and two Italian Divisions, and were opposed by the I, II and VII-German Armies, greatly reinforced, possessing superior numbers and supported by massed artillery. This was a drawn battle.

On July 16, Ludendorff ordered the I and Ill-Armies to be disposed on the defensive, and on July 17 he ordered the VII-Army to do likewise.

The initiative had been lost for two reasons:

First: Exhaustion of men and material. While on the side of the Allies control of the seas ensured replacements—with Germany the blockade rendered impossible the efficient upkeep of material, and the failure to achieve victory after the colossal effort since March 21, together with the losses in personnel and the depletion of Reserves, had seriously lowered the fighting capacity of the troops.

Second: Great credit should be given the French General Staff for the plan to meet this attack; their armies abandoned the front lines, leaving in them only small detached posts, backed by occasional wired strong points, and took up a position in rear, to be beyond interference of the German artillery. After suffering loss from such of the outposts that remained after the Artillery bombardment, the enemy came against unshaken forces in rear positions and were held.

This tactical change in the conduct of the defense—and its success—had the greatest effect upon the war. Advantage was taken of the German loss of initiative, and on July 18, Foch launched his first great offensive.

Page 699—On July 18th Franco-American troops started a counter-offensive.

The Fifteenth Scottish and the ThirtyFourth English Divisions also took part— but are not mentioned. Six United States Divisions were engaged in this battle; and Ludendorff writes:

“The six American Divisions that had taken part in the battle had suffered most severely without achieving any successes. One division appears to have been broken up in order to bring them up to Establishment. Notwithstanding the gallantry of the individual American soldier, the inferior quality of American troops is proved by the fact that two brave German Divisions were able to withstand the main attack made by very superior American forces for several weeks: and these two divisions, the Fourth Ersatz and the 201st, I had up till then considered no better than the average.”

Page 699: Stress is laid upon the moral effect upon the enemy of United Statesq preparation for war. We fail, however, to find anything wrong with the morale of the German Army until the time of the failure of their last offensive, July 15, 1918.

From March 21 till that date their morale was high. It was broken by defeat in the field.

Earl Haig, whose ruling should bear the greatest weight, in a speech shortly before his death, expressed the opinion that the war would have been won in 1918, even if the United States had not entered.

Page 70—Convoy system impossible of effective adoption before the United States entered the war because of the lack of antisubmarine craft.

This statement is not true.

The Canadian and Australian troops were convoyed, and no less than fifteen convoys, consisting of three merchant ships, each guarded by warships, sailed from Halifax in 1916, when German raiders were out. To say that the convoy system was impossible is not true from another standpoint, namely, naval strategy.

The naval authorities, before 1917, did not consider a dispersion of force to protect merchantmen necessary or sound, though in times of peril from enemy raiders the convoy system was resorted to before that date. Furthermore, it was not considered that merchant ships could be operated with sufficient skill in close formation to avoid damage in bad weather. To quote Admiral Sims, who commanded the United States Fleet in European waters:

“The convoy system is in principle, as old as naval warfare, but it was resorted to during the Great War only as a matter of necessity, because modern warfare had so altered conditions at sea that many naval officers did not consider it possible for merchant seamen to operate large convoys of ships sailing in close formation, without exposing them to greater damage through collision, grounding, etc., than would be occasioned by enemy submarines operating against individual ships,” and

“The convoy system across the Atlantic Ocean was in reality but an enlargement of that used by the British in protecting the naval lines of communication from England to the Continent, by means of which about twenty million souls were escorted during the four years of war, without a single loss of life from enemy action.”

Consider the reason given:

Because of lack of anti-submarine craft.

Out of 5,000 anti-submarine craft in submarine infested waters, only 160 were operated by the United States.

Admiral Sims states that out of 205 German submarines destroyed during the war, ninety per cent were sunk by Great Britain, five per cent by the United States and five per cent by France and Italy.

Further, on page 683, the text reads:

It was the withdrawal of this solemn pledge, namely, “Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without providing for the safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance,” that, as we shall learn, was the immediate cause of the United States entering the war early in 1917, on the side of the Allies.

The now-famous Zimmermann letter, which was intercepted by the British Intelligence Service, proved the fact that Germany was tampering with Mexico and Japan, with a view to having the former embarrass the United States with the assistance of the latter nation, which was to break with the Allies.

This was the cause of the United States declaring war upon Germany two months later—April 6—stated in this history, "early in 1917.”

This proposal would be, virtually, a German-Mexican Alliance, and the price of this arrangement was to be the states of New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. This proposal was sent through the medium of the German Minister to Mexico, Von Eckhardt.

The sinking of ships carrying a percentage of United States citizens apparently did not rouse the whole country to a realization of the necessity of a declaration of war, though a state of armed neutrality existed before the actual outbreak of hostilities. The effect of the Zimmermann letter, however, brought home to the people of the United States, particularly in the Western and Southern States, the fact that German treachery in Mexico was creating a real peril. This was thoroughly understood in connection with Mexico, which nation had always been a thorn in the flesh. President Wilson could, therefore, declare war with the full support of public opinion in all sections of the country. The Note is dealt with in the history—which states that it made war “inevitable.” It is pointed out that for the above-mentioned reasons it was the “immediate” cause. Fear, though perhaps unfounded—for it is hard to realize how Germany, bottled up by the British Fleet, could aid Mexico —appeared to be in this case stronger than righteous indignation over the death of United States citizens.

To sum up: In so far as the military operations are concerned, the reader is left under the impression that the war was won by Marshal Foch, but even he would have availed nothing had it not been for General Pershing, whose picture is shown, though the names of Earl Haig, Lord French and Sir Arthur W. Currie do not appear.

The general effect on the youthful mind from a perusal of that portion of the socalled history that deals with the war, is one of confusion, with the subconscious idea that the United States effort was far greater than that of the British Empire, and this is bred by an absorption of misstatements and half-truths, together with the omission of essential facts where they do not support the idea of the writer, namely, the glorification of his own country—the United States of America.

This so-called history is a supplement to United States propaganda flooding this country in the form of periodicals, films and radio; and is more dangerous than these, for it bears the official sanction of Canadian Departments of Education, and is being taught in Canadian schools.

So concludes the report of the New Brunswick Historical Society.

Why U.S. Books Are Used

VARYING reasons for the continued use of these textbooks, in the face of protest, are given by the authorities responsible for their adoption in schools, but there is unanimity in the statement that “those protesting the use of the United States books have not pointed out where better ones may be obtained; that there is no general history of Canadian authorship; that Myer’s History covers as much or more ground than those from British sources; and that the teachers like it.”

The first question to arise is whether it is the parent’s duty to find suitable textbooks, or whether that duty devolves upon the school authorities. The second point, that there is no general world history of Canadian authorship, seems to be correct, but no serious attempt has been made to rectify the situation. The third point is limp. Myer’s History covers the ground from a United States viewpoint, not British, and what school teacher could flout his superintendent?

Another reason given is that, even were Canadian authors encouraged to produce Canadian textbooks, it would be impossible to secure them at the prices paid for United States material. Certain reputable publishers deny this flatly. But whatever the case may be in regard to price, the attitude that is held by those who advance such an excuse, seems to be extraordinary. To them, the Canadianization of Canada isn’t worth a few cents.

Still another reason, and a somewhat extraordinary one, is that Myer’s History has been “approved by the theologians,” and that it is difficult to get histories either of Canada, England or general histories that meet the religious views of all. Dr. W. S. Carter, Chief Superintendent of Education for New Brunswick, subscribes to this opinion. In a statement by him, published in a New Brunswick newspaper, Dr. Carter is quoted as saying “that he had considered the various English histories but all had been rejected due to objection taken by Canadian theologists.”

Who are the Canadian theologists? What are their objections? Having gone so far, Dr. Carter should tell the public the full truth. Can it be true that in this entire Dominion, or throughout the whole of Britain, there is not a historian who can set down facts without injecting harmful religious prejudices? And what is there about Myer’s History that so favorably impresses the theologians?

It is interesting, also, to note that Premier Baxter, of New Brunswick, has never been satisfied with Myer’s History, but he has made the statement that it has been found impossible to secure any other book that is at all adequate.

Mysterious Antagonism

SUGGESTIONS have been made that S' the Dominion Government should offer a reward for the writing of a general History from the Canadian standpoint, the hope being that all provinces might adopt it as standard. But the suggestion has apparently been dropped because of what is described as “certain antagonism.” Just what that antagonism is, nobody seems to know. If the people of New Brunswick are sufficiently interested, maybe they can find out.

It is not the place of MacLean’s Magazine to make recommendations as to whose history books should be used or who should be engaged to write them. But it considers it to be its duty, as a national publication, to focus public attention on the use in Canadian schools of United States textbooks. Apart from the question of history, with which this article is mainly concerned, it cannot see why Canadian children should be taught Latin by reading translations of “The Star Spangled Banner.” It cannot see why Canadian children should have constantly before them pictures of the celebrities of another land and none of their own. It cannot see why July 4 should mean more to a Canadian child than July 1. It believes that if there are no suitable Canadian textbooks available, there are plenty of men and women in this Dominion who are perfectly capable of preparing them. It believes that it is altogether likely that some of the persons entrusted with the administration of Canadian education are so lacking in patriotism and vision that they are unfitted for the posts they hold. And it believes that if public opinion is sufficiently expressed, the situation can be changed without delay. Nor should that opinion reflect upon the United States, which nation shows more wisdom than we do in the instilling of its young with love of nationhood. What faults there are, are to be found in Canada. In the vernacular, “it’s up to us.”